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RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE
OIL AND GAS ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Patrick H. Martin I
/
1. Introduction to Oil and Gas Conservation Agencies and Hearings
The Conservation Agencies - Each oil- and gas-producing
state has an agency that regulates the oil and gas industry. It may
be called the Railroad Commission as it is in Texas, the Corporation
Commission as it is in Oklahoma and Kansas, the Oil and Gas Board as
in Alabama and Mississippi, the Industrial Commission as in North
Dakota, or the Office of Conservation as in Louisiana. In some
states the conservation agency is established by the state constitu-
tion, while in others the conservation agencies are wholly a creature
of the legislature. Authority may be vested in a commission or board
or in a single individual. A commissioner may be elected or appointed
under state law, and the position may be full-time employment or
part-time service. In all significant oil-producing states there
will be a large professional staff. These agencies developed years
ago, even before the proliferation of federal and state agencies and
the expansion of administrative due process. They have confronted
many of the issues that are before agencies and administrative law
judges today and are blown by the same winds in the law that buffet
1/ Patrick H. Martin is Campanile Professor of Mineral Law and has
taught at the Louisiana State University Law Center since 1977. From
1982 to 1984 he served as the Commissioner of Conservation for the
State of Louisiana. Prior to joining the faculty at LSU, Professor
Martin taught at the University of Tulsa Law School, and before that
he was a staff attorney with Gulf Oil Corporation in New Orleans.
Professor Martin holds the B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from
Louisiana State University and the J.D. degree from the Duke
University Law School. His publications include numerous articles on
oil and gas law and energy regulation as well as Pooling and Unitiza-
tion (with Kramer) (Matthew Bender, October 1989) and a casebook,
Economic Regulation: Energy, Transportation and Utilities (with
Pierce and Allison). An editor of the Oil and Gas Reporter, Professor
Martin has also served as an arbitrator and consultant in the oil and
gas industry. This paper was presented to the Annual Meeting and
Seminar of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges,
New Orleans, Louisiana, October, 1989.
all agencies. The decisions I will discuss form simply a convenient
database or sampling of the same types of issues arising in other
types of agencies and agency proceedings. By using a multi-state
perspective, the sampling may alert you to some new developments that
you may not have encountered elsewhere.
The functions of the conservation agencies - The agencies
regulate all phases of the oil and gas industry, from the permitting
of wells to the disposal of oil field wastes. Of most concern to us
for our discussion are the matters that involve quasi-judicial
proceedings, proceedings in which the agency holds a hearing and
issues an order based on findings of fact and the application of
legal principles to those facts. These are often adversarial in
nature, sometimes involving private parties contending against one
another and other times involving primarily one party making conten-
tions in regard to the state. Hearing proceedings typically include
the granting of permits to drill wells at exception locations,
production allowable determinations, and forced pooling (the merger
of interests in an area around an oil or gas well that determines who
will be entitled to share in the production from the well and who
will have to bear a share of the costs of the well). Such decisions
by the agency may involve millions of dollars and often are the
subject of litigation.
2. Hearing Officials
In many states the hearing will be conducted before a
hearing examiner (or administrative law judge) rather than the
members of the Commission or Board itself. In New Mexico, for
example, the Oil Conservation Division has three hearing examiners
who are petroleum engineers, assisted by legal counsel. The hearing
examiner ma s recommendations to the Division Director who issues
the order. - By statute, one can appeal an examiner decision to the
Commission (consisting of the Director of Oil Conservation Division,
the Commissioner of Public Lands and the State Geologist, who is also
the Director of the Mining and Minerals Division of the Energy and
Minerals 3partment) within 30 days of the order for a de novo
hearing. - In Texas, a legal examiner usually conducts legal
hearings, sometimes with the assistance of a technical examiner
2/ Pearce, "Special Legal Issues and Practice Before the New Mexico
Oil Conservation Division," Institute on Oil and Gas Conservation Law
and Practice, Paper 5 at 5-9, 10 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Founda-
tion, 1985).
3/ N. Mex. Stat. Section 70-2-13.
(e.g., exceptions to spacing or density rules or ratable take issue);
a technical examiner (petroleum engineer or geologist) conducts
technical hearings sometimes ,th the assistance of a legal examiner
(e.g., special field rules). - In Louisiana, the conservation
statute allows the Commissioger of Conservation to designate a staff
member to hear proceedings, - but some Commissioners have been very
active in conducting hearings personally.
Necessity of commissioners actually hearing - Challenges
have been made to orders on the ground that the agency head or
commission members did not actually hear all the testimony and
evidence. As a matter of administrative law, such an assertion is on
the principle announced by the United States Supreme Court in the
decisiogin Morgan v. United States: "The one who decides must
hear." - The principle enjoys no more favor in the states than at
the Federal level after the Supreme Court backed away from its
statement in Morgan, and the courts have nded to avoid ruling on
the matter in conservation agency cases. - While statutes often
specifically authorize the agency to designate a person to conduct
hearings, issue may be raised on appeals from a hearing officer's
decision or recommendations whether the Commissioners or Board
members actually considered the evidence presented to the hearing
examiner and contained in the record. To make out a claim of inade-
quate consideration by the deciding body, the litigant would need to
be able to depose the members of the agency. Such discovery is
inappropriate for a judicial or quasi 4udicial official absent a
prima facie showing of irregularity. -
4/ Schenkkan and Melvin, "Special Legal Issues and Practice Before
the Texas Railroad Commission," Institute on Oil and Gas Conservation
Law and Practice, Paper 7, at 7-5 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Founda-
tion, 1985).
5/ La. R. S. 30:6B.
6/ Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
7/ Summers v. Sutton, 428 So.2d 1121, 78 O.&G.R. 41 (La. App.
1983); White v. Amoco Production Company, 704 P.2d 470, 85 O.&G.R.
616 (Okla. 1985).
8/ See Florida Economic Advisory Council v. Federal Power Commission,
251 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1957) cert. denied, 356 U.S. 959 (1958). But
see State Oil & Gas Board v. McGowan, 542 So.2d 244 (Miss. 1989)
discussed infra.
Citing Morgan, a dissatisfied royalty o er in State Oil
and Gas Board of Alabama v. Seaman Paver Company objected to the
enlargement of a reservoir-wide unit on the grounds that a majority
of the members of the Board who made the order did not hear the
testimony. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this. The transcript
showed that at all times there were two members of the Board present.
Two constituted a quorum. And the court noted: "The transcripts of
all proceedings held by the Board are available at all times for any
new member or any absent meT~r to read concerning the evidence
presented at the hearing." - The court then went over the fact
that certain of the Board members had heard all or much of the
proceeding.
3. Notice
Who has a right to notice of an agency hearing and what
type of notice one has a right to are issues affected not only by the
procedural regulations of the agency, but also by statute and consti-
tutional requirements. The two leading United States Constitution
cases are not in the context of a conservation agency proceeding, but
nonetheless are c Drolling. These are Mullm v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. - and Greene v. Lindsey. -__1 These hold that
where a property right will be affected by a judicial or administra-
tive decision, due process requires notice reasonably calculated
under all the circumstances to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objection. The notice, the court has said, must be of such
nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must
afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.
In determining reasonableness of effort to give notice,
there are competing interests at work for both the agencies and the
courts. If drilling and spacing units are being set up for a large
area, say three or four thousand acres at one time, there may be many
thousands of people who could be said to be affected by the agency
9/ State Oil and Gas Board of Alabama v. Seaman Paper Company, 235
So.2d 860, 36 O.&G.R. 1 (Ala. 1970).
10/ 235 So.2d at 875.
11/ Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70
S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).
12/ Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 72 L.Ed.2d 249, 102 S.Ct.
1874, 72 L.Ed.2d 249 (1982).
proceedings. Each tract of land may have a separate owner (or
several as in co-owned family property) and that owner may have
created royalty interests or acquired the land subject to other
royalty interests. Fractional m ral interests may have been
created at one time or another.-- The mineral owners may have
leased and the lessee may have assigned, subleased or farmed-out his
interest. The time and expense of checking title to all of this can
be great. Indeed, it will be onerous to an operator who is having to
identify others who will share in the production of a well the
operator is drilling; these others may come forward to oppose the
operator's efforts.
Moreover, the agency proceeding may go through several
stages before a hearing or final decision is reached. Is the appli-
cant required to search out and discover changes in title that occur
while the proceeding is pending or going forward? Is the state to
bear the expense and responsibility of notices? If notice is not
properly given to someone who might be affected, what is the conse-
quence of this? Is the order void in its entirety, or is it ineffec-
tive just as to the party without proper notice? It would be unfair
to the parties who have taken part in the proceedings and made
decisions in reliance on an agency order to have to start all over
for one party who had not had notice. It may be a burden on state
resources to require the agency to attempt to locate all persons who
might be affected by an order and give each individual notice of a
proceeding. On the other hand, the oil and gas rights of an owner
are property rights. These should not be taken or diminished without
affording due process to the owner.
With these competing concerns at work, it is not surprising
that the courts have interpreted due process as requiring simply
reasonable efforts at giving notice. Seeing to it that notice is
given will be primarily the responsibility of the applicant before
the agency, not the agency, though the agency will generally be the
one to provide jurisdictional notice (i.e., notice published in a
specified newspaper pursuant to statutory requirement). The formal
notice requirements observed in a court proceeding will not be
13/ The difficulties of giving notice are vividly illustrated in
the Arkansas case of Katter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 765 F.2d
730, 85 O.&G.R. 443 (8th Cir. 1985). Here the well operator proposing
a unit sought to pool the undivided one-half interest in minerals on
38.5 acres of land of the Katters in 1979. The family had resided in
Beirut, Lebanon since the 1940's. The Commission gave them notice by
mail to the American Embassy, which obviously did reach them.
demanded of an administrative agency. While at least one court has
based a decision not requiring individual notice on the propositin
that establishing spacing units is a quasi-legislative action, ---
this seems to be an incorrect view. Proceedings to establish spacing
units or for pooling are quasi-judicial in character, but due process
does not require the type of notice by personal service that would
obtain in a judicial proceeding.
Whom should be given notice? The statutes may provide who
has a right to notice and the procedural rules of the agency will
generally specify the persons to be given notice. But they may do so
only in general terms, such as those having a right to participate in
production from the well. The persons specified by the regulations
must be given notice at a minimum. Certainly all those who have a
present interest to share in production from a proposed unit or who
own the land should be given notice of proceedings for compulsory
pooling or unitization. Prudence would counsel giving notice to
adjacent owners even if it is not proposed that they share. Other-
wise, the agency determination will not be binding upon them and they
will be free to litigate the findings of the agency. If they are
given notice and fail to take part in the agency proceeding, they
will not be able to litigate the agency determination because they
will be collaterally attacking an order of the agency or will have
failed to exhaust an administrative remedy available to them.
From one point of view, lessors might be regarded as being
by their lessees in administrative matters, and thus neither notice
nor participation in a hearing would be necessary. But several
reasons exist for rejecting such an approach. Lessors have an
interest which they will enjoy from production and are directly
affected by the proceedings. Second, the interests of lessor and
lessee might well be antagonistic. The lessee with leases on two
adjacent tracts, A and B (300 acres each), may put on evidence that a
fault line lies on the B lessor's property such that five acres of B
are drained by a well on tract A. The lessor should have the oppor-
tunity to show otherwise because he will not be able to attack the
determination of the fault line collaterally in a suit against the
14/ See Superior Oil v. Beery, 64 So.2d 357, 2 O.&G.R. 1094 (Miss.
1953). Compare Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum Corporation, 732
P.2d 438, 91 O.&G.R. 294 (Okla. 1986): "Because spacing clearly calls
for a factual finding and affects the proprietary incidents of the
mineral estate of every owner sought to be brought within the new
unit, we conclude that a quest for the formation of a drilling and
spacing unit calls for adjudication rather than rulemaking." 732
P.2d at 442, 91 O.&G.R. at 301.
lessee. The converse is true also: if the lessor cannot take part
in the hearing, then he ought to be able to attack the hearing order
collaterally. This would put the court in the position of evaluating
geological and engineering matters and would not be an efficient,
effective means of resolving technical matters.
Notice to lessees sufficient to protect interests of
lessors for order to permit infill drilling and assignment of allow-
ables to infill wells - The caselg Southwest Kansas Royalty Owners
v. State Corporation Commission - reviewed an order of the Kansas
Corporation Commission amending the basic proration order for the
Hugoton Gas Field to allow infill drilling. Personal notice was not
served on all royalty owners. The applicant, Cities Service, mailed
personal notice to its royalty owners, but the Commission mistakenly
found that notice had been mailed to all royalty owners. This meant
over 10,000 royalty owners were not given personal notice. But
proper notice was given to the 137 operators of wells and all 10 of
the pipeline purchasers in the field. The court distinguished the
Oklahoma case of Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum Corpora-
tion, discussed infra, which required personal notice to all who
might be affected by an order, on the ground that the order permitting
infill drilling did not effect an involuntary change in existing
property rights, but merely authorized the optional drilling of a
second well on each production unit. While there was some potential
for conflict between an operator and different royalty owners, the
order did not change the contractual duties of the operator to the
royalty owner under the implied covenant to prevent drainage. Notice
to all operators protected the interests of the royalty owners.
Therefore, the court said, every party who might be adversely affected
received actual notice through personal service, publication notice,
or contractual obligations. This was reasonable notice, and the
constitutional test is simply one of reasonableness. But the court
went on to say that the pipelines and utility appellants lacked
standing to raise the question of notice to the royalty owners who
were not complaining of lack of notice. Also, the notice provided
was broad enough to cover the action actually taken by the Commission.
Rather than cover all the state rulings on notice, I will
focus on several of the recent cases out of Oklahoma. The Oklahoma
conservation statutes have contained several provisions for notice
that have differed as to the type of proceeding. The notice has
varied as to time for notice and as to place of publication of the
15/ Southwest Kansas Royalty Owners v. State Corporation Commission,
244 Kan. 157, 769 P.2d 1 (1989).
notice. The Commission'slyles of procedure have made additional
requirements for notice, - and the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
rendered several opinions spelling out in detail the notice that mustbe provided as a matter of due process. While the Oklahoma courts
initially 192 ked upon limited statutory notices by publication as
adequate, - the Oklahoma Supreme Court in more recent years has
imposed more extensive and detailed requirements that have not
sharply distinguished among the types of proceeding before the
Corporation Commission.
1 8 /The 1986 case of Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum Corpo-ration reviewed the recent developments and set forth a fairlydefinitive standard to be followed in most Corporation Commission
proceedings. The case immediately concerned an issue of notice of a
spacing hearing by publication. The lands at issue were included in
an area for 640-acre spacing in 1974, and the Corporation Commission
gave notice of the proceeding only by publication in accordance with
the statute. Carlile's predecessors leased to a party who assigned
to Cotton. Cotton drilled a well with the Carlile lease in the
16/ See Rule 8 of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission Rules of
Practice.
17/ Holmes v. Corporation Commission, 466 P.2d 630, 36 O.&G.R. 635(Okla. 1970); Ranola Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission, 460 P.2d 415,35 O.&G.R. 215 (Okla. 1969) (notice for pooling is under Section 97
requiring only 10-day notice published in Oklahoma City newspaper
rather than 15-day notice of Section 87.1(a) dealing well spacing and
drilling units]; Price v. Corporation Commission, 382 P.2d 425, 18
O.&G.R. 1051 (Okla. 1963). But see the Federal district court
opinion in Moore Oil, Inc. v. Snakard, 150 F.Supp. 250, 8 O.&G.R. 285(W.D. Okla. 1957), remanded for further proceedings on joint motion
of the parties, 249 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1957) holding that a pooling
order was void for lack of notice and thus subject to collateral
attack. The order showed on its face that notice was not given to a
party who was record owner of leases. The want of notice resulted
directly from the default of the applicant in failing to comply with
Corporation Commission rules. "The failure to file the required
affidavit with the application (the instrument filed lacking both
signature of the applicant and acknowledgment) appears on the face of
the record of the proceedings. This defect was jurisdictional and
rendered the order entered at the conclusion of such proceedings
subject to collateral attack." 150 F.Supp. at 260.
18/ Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum Corporation, 732 P.2d 438, 91
O.&G.R. 294 (Okla. 1986).
spacing area, but the well was not on the Carlile lease land.
:arlile brought a suit to quiet title claiming that the spacing order
was invalid because of lack of notice and that the lease had thus
lapsed. While the court here reversed the trial court's summary
judgment for Carlile, the court announced a new rule regarding
notice. Stated the court: "When a party's name and address are
reasonably ascertainable from sources available at hand, communica-
tion by mail or other means certain to insure actual notice is deemed
to be a constitutional prerequisite in every procq 9 ina which affects
either a person's liberty or property interest." --7 The court went
on to specify the constitutional minimum:
At a minimum, well spacing procedures should include (a) the
filing by Commission officials of an affidavit for publication
service which reflects the identity of the parties whose where-
abouts are unknown for service of process and cannot be ascer-
tained with due diligence, (b) an adjudicative inquiry by the
Commission into the sufficiency of the search to ascertain the
whereabouts of parties served solely by publication and (c) a
recitation in the Commission well spacing order that [11 upon an
examination of the record and proof of publication, the Commis-
sion found the process to be proper and [2] upon an adjudicative
inquiry into the factual issue of due diligence, the Commission
found that its officials conducted a meaningful search of all
reasonably available sources at hand to ascertain the whereabouts
of those entitled to notice but who were served solely by
publication. -like procedure should be followed in a poolina
application. 16V
The court contrasted the standards of notice for rulemaking
and adjudication: "Because spacing clearly calls for a factual
finding and affects the proprietary incidents of the mineral estate
of every owner sought to be brought within the new unit, we conclude
that a quest for the formation of a drilli ,and spacing unit calls
for adjudication rather than rulemaking." - The new standard
applied to pending matters and those presently on appeal.
19/ 732 P.2d 438 at 444, 91 O.&G.R. 294 at 304 (emphasis in
original).
20/ 732 P.2d 438 at 444, 91 O.&G.R. 294 at 305-006 (emphasis in
original).
21/ 732 P.2d at 442, 91 O.&G.R. at 301.
New notice must be given when change of relief sought i92 /
application by intervenor - In Carpenter v. Powel Briscoe, Inc., -
the Oklahoma court affirmed a Corporation Commission denial of relief
to parties intervening in a proceeding to clarify a previous order.
The Commission lacked jurisdiction where proper notice of the change
in relief sought by the intervenors was not given. Powel Briscoe,
Inc. drilled a well in an area with 160-acre spacing with provision
that wells should be in center of each unit (any point within a
square 10 acres in the center of the unit). In issuing this order,
the Commission overlooked the fact that the well here was not in the
center of the spacing unit thus established. It issued a clarifying
order granting an exception location in accordance with regular
principle that exception location be given. Intervenors objected to
the clarifying order and sought to change the spacing pattern so that
their land was in the spacing unit for this well. In affirming the
Commission denial, the court said: "We are not going to hold that a
different relief can never be sought in an intervening petition, but
we believe and hold Section 112, Title.52 O.S. 1961 applicable t
such a situation if a change of relief sought is permissible." '
Notice, said the court, is jurisdictional: "We therefore hold that
where the issues raised in the original application are changed by an
intervening application that to vest the Corporation Commission with
jurisdiction to hear such new issue, notice must be given as required
by Section 112, supra." 24/
No necessity to check records while proceeding is pending -
What must an applicant do with respect to possible title changes
after an application has been filed? Due diligence probably does not
encompass searching the records anew to notify persons who acquire
interests subsequent to 2te previous notice. At issue in Chancellor
v. Tenneco Oil Company - was the notice or lack of it given with
respect to a certain leasehold interest in a pooling proceeding.
Tenneco here had filed an application for pooling and sent notice to
the record owner of the mineral interest, Mason (through her agent).
Two days after this mailing, Chancellor took a lease from Mason. It
was not recorded for three weeks, about one week after the hearing of
22/ Carpenter v. Powel Briscoe, Inc., 380 P.2d 245, 18 O.&G.R. 635
(Okla. 1963).
23/ 380 P.2d at 247.
24/ 380 P.2d at 247-48.
25/ Chancellor v. Tenneco Oil Company, 653 P.2d 204, 75 O.&G.R. 341
(Okla. 1982).
the pooling application. The Commission issued a pooling order
requiring an election within 10 days of whether to participate in the
well costs or take a bonus or overriding royalty instead; failure to
elect would result in the owner being entitled only to the bonus
amount. This order was also mailed to Mason's agent. After the 10
days were up and with no election having been made by Mason or
Chancellor, Tenneco got a title opinion that now showed the lease.
Tenneco sent a check for bonus to Chancellor on the same day that it
brought in a producing well. Chancellor then notified Tenneco it
wished to participate in the well. When Tenneco declined, he filed a
suit to quiet title. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the
notice given to the record owner was adequate to comply with Oklahoma
law and Commission rules. It observed that a contrary decision
"would require an applicant before the Corporation Commission who
seeks to pool interests within a drilling and spacing unit to daily
check county records from the day of application until the Commis-
sion's order. . . . Also, such a holding would permit parties adverse
to the pooling application to defeat it by simply transferring their
property to another at or about the time the pooling hearing was held
and/or ~g stand by and, if the well be a producer, elect to partici-
pate."
Emergency Exceptions - Each state will make an exception as
to notice and hearing requirements in "emergency" situations. In
such matters as when a blowout or pollution is threatened, it is
necessary for the agency to take swift action. Both the specific
legislation of the agency and the state administrative procedure act
will authorize the agency to act without prior notice and opportunity
for hearing, though there may be a time limit as to the effectiveness
of the agency action without a subsequent hearing. There will be no
occasion for "emergency" action with respect to spacing, pooling and
unitization.
Effect of failure to give proper notice of a hearing - It
is often said that proper notice is jurisdictional. But the meaning
of this is not always understood correctly. Here one must distinguish
between subject matter jurisdiction of the agency and personal
jurisdiction. It is the statute itself which grants and delimits the
subject matter jurisdiction of the agency, such as the power to
space, to pool and to unitize. The statute may make publication of
the proceeding a requirement to vest the agency with subject matter
jurisdiction. The statute, or the state or federal constitution, may
also require notice to the individual as a matter of gaining personal
jurisdiction over an individual in order to affect the person's
26/ 653 P.2d at 206, 75 O.&G.R. at 345-46.
property rights. A failure to give notice to the individual does not
deprive the agency of subject matter jurisdiction. It follows,
therefore, that where the agency has subject matter jurisdiction an
order will be effective to those who had notice of the proceeding
even though it may be ineffective as to those who were not given
proper notice. That is to say, the order itself is not void in such
a circumstance; it is simply not binding on one who was not given
notice. The proper distinction is made by the South Dakota court in
the case of Application of Koch Exploration.
Notice not necessary to give agency subject matter juris-
diction, and 29 ?tice may be waived - The case of Application of Koch
Exploration - involved a proceeding in which Koch Exploration
sought to unitize part of an oil field for secondary and tertiary
recovery. The South Dakota Board of Minerals scheduled a hearing and
gave notice by publication. All but two of the affected mineral and
royalty owners showed up for the hearing, and they objected to the
allocation formula as unfair and as including barren acreage. The
Board approved the unitization plan. When the Board refused to grant
a rehearing, the plaintiffs brought suit. The trial court affirmed
the Board, but remanded to see if there was anyone with interests who
was not present at the hearing. There were two, but they were
apparently not among the plaintiffs. The Board tried to hold a
hearing for the two others, but this was held in abeyance pending the
decision on appeal; the Board lost jurisdiction pending the outcome
of the appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the unitization order of the
Board, making the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction. Although statutory notice alone may not have
been sufficient notice as a matter of constitutional law (but the
court did not expressly say this), a failure to give personal notice
did not deprive the Board of subject matter jurisdiction. In any
event, the appellants made a general appearance and did not object
to lack of personal jurisdiction; they participated fully. Personal
jurisdiction can be and was waived. Even with respect to the possi-
bility of persons without notice and who had not waived notice, the
order would not be void in toto but only as to those persons who had
not waived notice.
A couple of general observations can be made of other cases
that may be noted. What is required constitutionally is reasonable
notice. Most of the cases discussed hold that where notice has not
been given, the order is not void but only invalid as to the person
not given notice. These cases include, in addition to Application
27/ Application of Koch Exploration, 387 N.W.2d 530, 89 O.&G.R. 549
(S.D. 1986).
of Koch Exploration, 28/ Walker v. Cleary Petrolgm Corp., 29/
Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum Corporation, -- and Louthan v.
Amoco Production Co. 2 Several cases may be taken to indicate that
an order without proper notice being given to 3 5/person is a void
order. These are Moore W, Inc. v. Snakard - and Day v. State
Corporation Commission. 2 Actual notice is generally found to cure
any failure 5/provide notice in the manner prescribed b 5 9tatute or
regulation. - These cases include: Brown v. S-on, Applica-
tion of KochExploration, Superior Oil v. Beery, - Ohio Ail company
v. Porter, - Ranola Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission,
28/ Application of Koch Exploration, 387 N.W.2d 530, 89 O.&G.R. 549
(S.D. 1986).
29/ Walker v. Cleary Petroleum Corp., 421 So.2d 85, 76 O.&G.R. 433
(Ala. 1982).
30/ Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum Corporation, 732 P.2d 438, 91
O.&G.R. 294 (Okla. 1986).
31/ Louthan v. Amoco Production Co., 652 P.2d 308, 74 O.&G.R. 334
(Okla. App. 1982).
32/ Moore Oil, Inc. v. Snakard, 150 F.Supp. 250, 8 O.&G.R. 285
(W.D. Okla. 1957), remanded for further proceedings on joint motion
of the parties, 249 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1957).
33/ Day v. State Corporation Commission, 185 Kan. 165, 185 Kan.
382, 341 P.2d 1028, 345 P.2d 651, 11 O.&G.R. 795, 799 (Kan. 1959).
34/ This does not mean the party who appears at a hearing and
protests lack of notice is doing an ineffectual act. The agency may
continue the hearing to give additional time, and there is the
indication in Mullane that due process requires a reasonable time to
prepare.
35/ Brown v. Sutton, 356 So.2d 965, 60 O.&G.R. 29 (La. 1978).
36/ Superior Oil v. Beery, 64 So.2d 357, 2 O.&G.R. 1094 (Miss.
1953).
17/ The Ohio Oil Company v. Porter, 82 So.2d 636, 4 O.&G.R. 1898
(Miss. 1955).
38/ Ranola Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission, 460 P.2d 415, 35
O.&G.R. 215 (Okla. 1969).
Hladik v. Lee, 32/ and Railroad Commission v. Graford Oil. A_0/ The
defenses of estoppel or laches may be asserted in appropriate circum-
stances against a party complaining oilack of notice: Tara Oil
Company v. Kennedy & Mitchell, Inc., - Thompson v. Johns2-Kemnitz
Drillina Co. - and Katter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. -/
Likewise, the failure to raise the issue of notice timely may cause
it to be lost, as court held in Hutchison v. Pan American Petro-
leum Corporation. -
Who should be allowed to participate at a hearing - The
issue of notice should be separated from the issue of who should be
allowed to participate at a hearing. The nature of the participa-
tion, like the nature of the notice, will depend on the nature of the
proceeding. In rulemaking proceedings, participation will be limited
to making a statement or presentation. In quasi-judicial proceedings,
such as pooling and unitization hearings, the rights of participants
will be more extensive. Parties to a proceeding will have the
opportunity to put on evidence and take part in giving testimony and
39/ Hladik v. Lee, 541 P.2d 196, 53 O.&G.R. 45 (Okla. 1975).
40/ Railroad Commission v. Graford Oil Corp., 557 S.W.2d 946, 59
O.&G.R. 338 (Tex. 1977).
41/ Tara Oil Company v. Kennedy & Mitchell, Inc., 622 P.2d 1076, 70
O.&G.R. 323 (Okla. 1981).
42/ Thompson v. Johnson-Kemnitz Drilling Co., 145 P.2d 422 (Okla.
1943).
43/ Katter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 765 F.2d 730, 85 O.&G.R.
443 (8th Cir. 1985).
44/ Hutchison v. Pan American Petroleum Corporation, 388 F.2d 111,
28 O.&G.R. 421 (10th Cir. 1968). The Federal court did not rule on
the substance of the notice claim raised in this case because the
complaining parties had failed to exhaust their administrative
remedy. Notice was given only by publication of the hearing to
extend a spacing order area. The appellants filed an application
with the Commission then to exempt or exclude their mineral interests
from the proceeding. The Commission denied their petition, and they
did not appeal. They brought this suit then, contending the original
order extending the spacing deprived them of property without due
process since they were not given actual notice. They had failed to
raise the notice issue in their application to the Commission, and
they had failed to seek judicial review.
in examining or cross-examining witnesses. To be a party, one must
usually give notice of the intention to take part in the hearing so
that others may prepare appropriately. But others who simply show up
at the hearing are likely to be given the opportunity to speak even
if they are not afforded the opportunity to put on a case. Generally,
such statements will be in support of or in opposition to one of the
parties who has put on a case.
4. Conduct of Hearing
Conservation agency hearings, such as those for pooling and
unitization, are quasi-judicial in character. They are adjudications,
but they generally do not have the same formality as judicial pro-
ceedings. The same rules of procedure do not obtain; hearsay, for
example, will be admissible in most agencies. While agency proceed-
ings are informal, they are similar in format to a trial before a
judge. In an uncontested proceeding, the applicant makes its presen-
tation and may have questions directed at its witnesses by agency
personnel. In a contested case, the applicant will present its case
first, with the opposition having an opportunity to cross-examine the
applicant's witnesses. Cross-examination may be conducted by the
attorney or by a witness for the contesting parties or by both. The
opponents will then have the opportunity to present an opposing plan
of spacing or pooling or to put on evidence to contradict the appli-
cant's evidence. The applicant or other parties will have the
opportunity to cross-examine the opposing party's witness(es). The
applicant may then have the opportunity to put on rebuttal evidence
and opponents may be given the opportunity to put on surrebuttal
testimony. The parties will be allowed to make closing arguments.
Other interested persons will be given an opportunity to be heard
although they probably will not be allowed to put on technical
evidence if they have not become parties to the proceeding.
In some states, there may be a requirement that an attorney
be admitted to practice in the state or upon motion accompanied by an
attorney admitted in the state. There will often be three witnesses
in agency hearings, a landman, a geologist and a petroleum engineer,
with an attorney presenting the case and conducting the testimony of
the witnesses. But it is not uncommon to have a single witness
presenting much the same information as described below. The geolo-
gist and the engineer may have to qualify as experts prior to giving
expert testimony. The landman will testify as to ownership of
interests and steps taken to provide notice of the proceedings to
persons entitled to notice. The landman or other company personnel
may testify as to the making of an offer to pool voluntarily before
seeking compulsory pooling. The geologist will testify as to the
area underlain by a common pool, establishing matters such as subsur-
face contours, water levels and faulting, making use of well logs and
seismic data. An engineer will testify as to the area economically
and efficiently drained by a single well using data such as porosity
and permeability, gas-oil ratios and reservoir pressure. In some
types of proceedings it will be necessary to go over the economics of
drilling or production. For example, approval of a reservoir-wide
unitization will often require a demonstration that the proposal will
be profitable. Generally a petroleum engineer will be able to
testify to this and will not have to qualify as an expert in the
subject of economics.
The rules of procedure will normally spell out the number
of copies of exhibits that must be provided. A properly prepared set
of exhibits will clearly show the docket number, the title, the date,
the identity of the company, a legend for each exhibit, and the name
of the witness testifying as to each exhibit on that exhibit. All
wells and other points on the exhibit should be marked with correct
nomenclature. The person responsible for presenting the case should
tell each witness the importance in testimony of identifying the
exhibit, bearing in mind that the agency in preparation of a decision
and a reviewing court will have before it only a transcript and the
exhibits and will not be able to ask questions of the witness such as
where the witness was pointing. For example, the witness should say,
"Exhibit 5 of Acme Oil shows . . ." instead of saying "this page
shows."
The person responsible for presenting the case must like-
wise bear in mind the standard of review that a court will give an
agency determination and the degree of specificity of findings that
will be necessary to sustain an agency decision. That is to say, the
decision of the agency must be supported by substantial evidence.
The person preparing the case needs to determine in advance what will
constitute a prima facie case for, say, an exception well location or
an increased drilling density order and then see to it that the
standards of substantial evidence are met by the evidence he or she
puts on at the hearing. Likewise, the courts in some states are more
stringent than in others about what findings will have to be made by
the age Rg to satisfy the requirements of the statute or the reviewing
court.
Some agencies follow a practice of allowing the parties to
submit suggested forms of orders. These proposed orders should be
distributed to all parties at the hearing and entered into the record
45/ The findings that must be incorporated in an order are
discussed below.
to avoid the possibility of such a submission being characterized as
an ex Parte communication.
The hearing proceedings may take place in a matter of a few
minutes or they may take days. The proceedings can be discontinuous;
that is, they may begin on one hearing day and then be continued over
to another hearing date later. This allows the parties to prepare
additional evidence should this be necessary or desirable. There has
been very little litigation over the conduct of conservation hearings
by agencies. I should mention, however, the subject of "official
notice."
Official notice - Issue may arise as to the power of the
agency to take "judicial notice" or "official notice" of facts.
Statute may authorize the agency to take such notice provided that
the agency states it is taking notice and allowing an opportunity for
a party to contradict4te appropriateness of taking judicial notice.
In an Oklahoma case, A the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the
Corporation Commission as to a cost formula it had employed in an
order establishing a participation election because of the manner in
which the Commission had taken judicial notice; it had not relied on
any specific evidence. The court observed that an agency can take
judicial notice, but indicated that the agency must make the basis
for its actions clear for the parties to comply with due process.
The court queried: "How is it possible for this Court to review the
law and facts and intelligently decide that the findings and conclu-
sions of the Commission are supported by substantial evidence when
the evidence upon which the find 9ps and conclusions are based are
not in the record and unknown." - Without the Commission stating
the basis for the formula, the order was not supported by substantial
evidence.
Issue arose about "judicial notice" of Rule 37 exceptions
that the Railroad Commission considered as a basis for its findings
in a subsequent procefl~ng in Imperial American Resources Fund v.
Railroad Commission, - The court ruled that the law and the
Commission's own rules required notice so that any party could
contest the material, but that there would be no remand for this
46/ C.F.Braun & Co. v. Corporation Commission, 609 P.2d 1268, 65
O.&G.R. 391 (Okla. 1980).
47/ 609 P.2d at 1272, 65 O.&G.R. at 399.
48/ Imperial American Resources Fund v. Railroad Commission, 557
S.W.2d 280, 59 O.&G.R. 553 (Tex. 1977).
where there was no showing of harm from failure to give notice of the
material to be judicially noticed.
The court in Imperial American Resources Fund stated that
before the Texas Administrative Procedure Act the Railroad Commission
could use data in its own records, but that after the Act this would
be considered as ex Parte procedure. The provision noted by the
court stated: "Parties shall be notified . . . of the material
officially noticed, including any staff memoranda or data, and they
must be orded an opportunity to contest the material so no-
ticed." - It is submitted that the ruling of the court miscon-
ceives "staff data." The prior Commission rulings in Texas and in
other states are public records that are judicial in character. They
are binding on the parties and on the agency, and they are freely
available to the parties in subsequent proceedings in all or virtually
all states under the conservation statutes or under public records
statutes. Staff memoranda and data would be internal communications
and information gathered by the staff as opposed to the staff making
use of prior decisions. At the time of a hearing and receipt of the
evidence of the parties, the agency will not know what prior rulings
of the agency may have a bearing on the decision. If the agency must
recall the parties and reopen a hearing to inform the parties that it
will make use of certain of its prior public decisions, the agency
will be subject to endless and futile procedures. Likewise, the
agency should not be required to reexamine prior determinations as
the Texas court's approach seems to suggest. For example, where an
agency has defined a field and subjected it to 160-acre spacing, the
agency should not be required to announce it will take judicial
notice of this order and its underlying findings when a new party in
the field comes in and applies for a well on an 80-acre spacing
basis; nor should the agency be precluded from considering, without
informing the applicant in a new field, that it has spaced similar
fields on a 160-acre spacing pattern. A contrary approach leaves the
door open to rulings that are inconsistent, and it virtually requires
the state agency to become a party to a proceeding by having to
inform the parties what prior rulings of the agency that the agency
may consider significant to a decision where one of the parties has
failed itself to take note of the precedent(s) of the agency. An
agency should no more have to take official notice of specific prior
rulings than a court should have to announce to the parties in
litigation that it will look to prior judicial decisions.
49/ Section 14(q) of the Texas Administrative Procedure Act, as
quoted 557 S.W.2d 280, 288.
5. Discovery
In many states there will be the possibility of discovery
procedures being used under th 0 onservation statute or the state
administrative procedure act. - Questions may arise at this stage
about confidentiality of data. There are few cases from the courts
that indicate problems with pre-hearing procedures. Most of the
problems are cured by the time an order is issued. The applicant
will have the burden of making out his case before the agency. In
order for the applicant or an opponent to prevail at the agency level
and then be upheld by a court, there must be substantial evidence in
the record supporting the decision. If the applicant or opponent
fails to put on the evidence because of confidentiality claims, then
it is as though such information does not exist. A party cannot have
it both ways. Either evidence will be put on and subjected to
scrutiny, or it cannot be relied on as the basis for an expert
opinion.
There will be judgment calls as to putting on some evidence.
One generally does not get "two bites at the apple" in putting on
evidence before an administrative agmy. In Texas Oil and Gas
Corporation v. Railroad Commission, - the appellant had sought to
get the trial court to remand to the Commission for reopening the
record for the introduction of additional evidence. To get such a
remand, it was necessary to show that the evidence was material and
that there were good reasons for the failure of the party to present
the evidence before the agency. In this instance, the additional
evidence was seismic data that was available at the time of the
hearing. The testifying engineer made a judgment call not to put on
the seismic evidence. But the court concluded that errors in judg-
ment made during the agency hearing cannot constitute good reason for
ordering the Commission to consider additional evidence. Failure of
the Commission to grant a rehearing for receipt of this evidence was
not a denial of procedural due process. Similarly, the court in
50/ All or virtually all the states with conservation agencies
provide that the agency has subpoena power for documents and to
summon witnesses. E.g., Utah Stat. Section 40-6-11; Wyo.
Section 30-5-112. Such statutes may be implemented by further
regulations of the agency. E.g., Kansas Corporation Commission,
Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 82-1-227; Oklahoma Corporation
Commission, Rules of Practice, Rule 21.
51/ Texas Oil and Gas Corporation v. Railroad Commission, 575
S.W.2d 348, 62 O.&G.R. 254 (Tex. Civ. App., 1978).
Price v. Corporation Commission 52/ upheld a Commission denial of an
application to reopen a proceeding for introduction of additional
evidence on an issue already decided. There was no showing the
protestants had used due diligence to have such evidence available at
the earlier hearings.
Should differences in the pre-hearing stage emerge that
threaten the conduct of a hearing, a party or the agency can call for
a pre-hearing conference. Just as a judge can exercise authority to
get the parties to work together to have an orderly hearing, so too
can the agency use a pre-hearing conference to facilitate proceedings.
The emerging difficulty in this area, though, is the problem of ex
Darte communications. A pre-hearing conference that may affect the
conduct of the hearing is probably subject to the same standards of
notice and opportunity to participate as any hearing. Failure to
give notice and afford an opportunity of participation to all who may
be affected can well lead to a claim that some of the parties had ex
Parte communications with the agency. This could be fatal to an
order that is subsequently issued by the agency.
Any person involved in agency proceedings must be aware of
one troublesome development in connection with judicial proceedings
challenging agency action. This is the use of discovery against the
agency personnel. Now we have had judicial review of agency decisions
for many years. This has in the past generally been confined to the
record of the proceeding itself, and thus there has been no discovery,
such as depositions or the answering of interrogatories, of individual
agency officials. Increasingly, however, parties are bringing suit
before an agency decision has been reduced to a decision and are
bringing personal actions against the agency personnel. When such
suits are permitted to go forward, parties are perhaps able to get
discovery of agency decision processes.
A recent example of this use of dicovery is the Mississippi
case of State Oil & Gas Board v. McGowan. - In this case the
Mississippi Supreme Court held that deposition of the Oil and Gas
Board's supervisor could be taken under common law bill of discovery,
even though the remedy was not provided for under the Mississippi
Rules of Procedure. While there was no statutory right to utilize
discovery against administrative agency, a pure bill of discovery and
52/ Price v. Corporation Commission, 382 P.2d 425, 18 O.&G.R. 1051
(Okla. 1963).
53/ State Oil & Gas Board v. McGowan, 542 So.2d 244 (Miss. 1989).
chancery was available to compel the testimony of Oil and Gas Board's
supervisor.
A party named McGowan had a proceeding pending before the
State Oil and Gas Board, and he wanted certain information from the
Board in order to prepare for the hearing on the merits of the
pending matter. The Board denied McGowan's request for pre-hearing
discovery. McGowan then filed a complaint against the Board in the
Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County,
Mississippi, requesting (1) the Board to respond to all discovery in
accordance with the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, and
(2) seeking a temporary injunction against the Board from proceeding
to hear matters pending before the Board until a reasonable time
after the conclusion of discovery. The general rule in other juris-
dictions is that rules of civil procedure do not apply to administra-
tive proceedings unless the rules specifivlly so provide. A number
of state courts have applied this rule. - The chancellor held that
the scope of the rules of civil procedure do not apply to proceedings
before the Board and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed this.
The court also concluded that neither the Administrative Procedures
Act, nor the Rules of Procedure of the State Oil and Gas Board,
provide for any discovery procedure. Since this controversy was
within the original administrative jurisdiction of the Oil and Gas
Board, McGowan was subject to hearing under the rules and regulations
of that Board. Since the rules did not authorize administrative
discovery, he was not entitled to such discovery. But discovery was
available for protection of due process. The court stated:
Prior to an appeal from a final rule, regulation, or order, as
contemplated by the statute, the Chancery Court has no jurisdic-
tion to participate in the administrative process and it was
error to do so when the effect amounted to an intervention in
the pending proceeding. However, a litigant is not shut off
from all remedies for discovery merely because the rules of
civil procedure do not apply or because the roles of the admin-
istrative agency do not promote it. In appropriate cases a
54/ The Mississippi court cited the following: Georgia State Board
of Dental Examiners v. Daniels, 137 Ga. App. 706, 224 S.E.2d 820
(1976); International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2287, Montpelier
v. City of Montpelier, 133 Vt. 175, 332 A.2d 795 (1975), Clary v.
National Friction Products, Inc., 259 Ind. 581, 290 N.E.2d 53, 55
(1972); Quaker Oats Co. v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Com'n, 268
N.W.2d 862, 868 (Iowa 1978); Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Dorgan, 225
N.W.2d, 278, 282 (N.D. 1974).
1pure bill for discovery" will lie and statutory re gies may be
available to the end that due process be afforded. 
-
The problem is that one does not know whether discovery is
necessary to protect due process until one has had the discovery. It
is a simple matter to allege denial of due process, such as through
an ex Parte communication, and thereby gain discovery. This can be
used to harass and intimidate agency officials. Unfortunately, the
Mississippi Supreme Court gave no discussion of the underlying
controversy in McGowan. One should anticipate a great deal more such
litigation in the future.
6. Contempt Power
Generally, agency hearing officers lack contempt power.
There are occasional exceptions where statute or state constitution
has granted such power to an agency. 5 e case of Stamford Energy
Cos., Inc. v. Corporation Commission -- illustrates a case in which
the court held that the Oklahoma Corporation Commission has the
authority to hold an operator in civil contempt for violation of a
Corporation Commission order because of unlawful acts of service
contractors hired by operator.
7. Internal Appeal
Internal appeals - There may be one or more layers of
internal appeal within an agency. It is necessary to exhaust all
such internal appeals or other administrative remedies before seekingjudicial review. I will not go over the exhaustion doctrine, but
mention it simply as a prelude to observing that there is question
raised as to the deference that the administrative body must give to
the findings or decision of a hearing examiner or administrative lawjudge. While some Federal courts and some state administrative
procedures acts have raised the status of the hearing officer's
findings 5  about the same level as a trial court's findings on
appeal, - this has not appeared in conservation matters. That is,
55/ 542 So.2d at 249.
56/ Stamford Energy Cos., Inc. v. Corporation Commission, 764 P.2d
880 (Okla. 1988).
57/ E.g., see Ferris v. Austin, 487 So.2d 1163 (Fla. App., 1986),
cause dismissed by Austin v. Ferris, 492 So.2d 1330 (Fla., 1986).
the courts which have taken up the issue thus far have held that the
commission is not required.i give any particular weight to the
hearing officer's report. 5_ 
'
In Cameron v. Corporation Commission, 9/ Cameron filed an
application seeking to delete land from a 20-acre Rowe Zone spacing
on the ground that a vertical fault was now known to separate the
land from the remainder of the spaced area, creating a separate
source of supply. The hearing examiner recommended that the applica-
tion be granted, but the Commission denied the application. The
court held the Commission decision was supported by substantial
evidence and stated:
Title 17 O.S. 1961, Sec. 162, authorizes the Commission, inter
alia, to assign persons in its regular employ as examiners,
conduct hearings and receive evidence and report the same to the
Commission. The statute, supra, does not attach any particular
weight or significance to the Examiner's report. Regardless of
whatever weight the Commission may attach to the report, the
Commission is the final arbiter of the issues. It is our
opinion that, under these circumstances, the report of the
Examiner is entitled to no special weight in this court in
determining whether thw0 2 rder of the Commission is supported by
substantial evidence. -
61/ In the case of Van Horn Oil Co. v. Corporation Commis-
sion, the Oklahoma court ruled that the commission could overturn
the decision of a hearing officer to grant a continuance of a hearing
even though the hearing officer did not err in reaching the decision
for continuance.
The Oklahoma court's approach is the proper one in the
absence of legislation to the contrary. The hearing officer is a
58/ W.L. Kirkman, Inc. v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 676 P.2d
283, 79 O.&G.R. 305 (Okla. App. 1983); Cameron v. Corporation Commis-
sion, 414 P.2d 266, 24 O.&G.R. 444 (Okla. 1966).
59/ Cameron v. Corporation Commission, 414 P.2d 266, 24 O.&G.R. 444
(Okla. 1966).
60/ 414 P.2d at 272.
61/ Van Horn Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission, 753 P.2d 1359
(Okla. 1988).
civil servant. While the conservation agencies have very competent
staff, it is the agency board or commission itself which possesses
and exercises statutory authority and is responsible to the public,
directly to the voters or indirectly through the elected official
appointing the members of the board. The agency must consider policy
matters that go beyond the immediate concerns of a hearing official.
Generally, too, the reasons for deference by an appellate court to a
trial court are not present in the administrative context. Although
the expert witness's testimony is crucial to a proceeding, the
demeanor of the witness in the typical oil and gas proceeding is not
much of a factor in evaluating his or her testimony, and the credi-
bility can be assessed as easily from the transcript and exhibits as
by personally hearing the witness.
Failure to appeal to Corporation grmission from Review
Panel - In Sooner Oil & Gas Corp. v. State - a party sought review
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court of an order of an Administrative Review
Panel within the Corporation Commission. The party had not sought
review by the Corporation Commission of the order, presumably because
the party had failed to seek a rehearing from the Administrative
Review Panel within the 10-day period allowed by regulation, and
appeal to the Corporation Commission was conditioned on a filing for
rehearing by the Administrative Review Panel. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court refused to allow the appeal because no appeal to the Commission
had been taken first.
8. Issuance of Order or Decision within Specified Time
Commonly the act authorizing pooling by the conservation
agency will specify the time within which the order or decision of
the agency must be rendered. But the statute in all likelihood will
not state the consequence of the agency's failure to comply with the
deadline. Of course, the failure of the agency to render the decision
when it is due may give one the basis for instituting an action in
court for issuance of a mandate to the agency to render the decision,
but such an act would cause the party seeking a mandamus to wonder if
he were not inviting an unfavorable decision. The courts which have
62/ Sooner Oil & Gas Corp. v. State, 635 P.2d 599, 71 O.&G.R. 551
(Okla. 1981). The Corporation Commission's Administrative Review
Panel, which made the initial decision that the appellant failed to
seek rehearing in Sooner Oil & Gas was declared unconstitutional in
Hair v. Corporation Commission, 740 P.2d 134, 96 O.&G.R. 333 (Okla.
1987).
examined the issue of a late decision or order have said that the
order is not made invalid by its tardiness.
Decision not issued within 30 days upheld - The Alabama Oil
and Gas Board held its hearing on the proceeding at ime in State
Oil and Gas Board of Alabama v. Seaman Paper Company - on October 15,
1965, and stated they would take the matter under advisement. The
statute provided that the Board would hear the matter "and in any
event within thirty (30) days after the conclusion of such hearing,
shall take such actz with regard to the subject matter as it may
deem appropriate." - The Board met again on December 17, 1965, and
took additional evidence and issued an order of that date. The party
challenging the order was present on December 17, 1965, and "made no
point of the fact that additional testimony could not be heard or
that the Board's right to enter an order . . . had expired because no
such order had been entered within thirty days from October 1965,
nor an order of continuance during that thirty-day period." - Nor
was the point raised in the initial filings of the claim in equity.
In other words, the court seemed to say that the plaintiff had waived
the claim.
Order not iss 9 within 30 days upheld - In State Oil and
Gas Board v. Brinkley, - the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed an
Oil and Gas Board decision denying an application for the establish-
ment of a drilling unit. The court rejected the claim that the
Board's failure to act within thirty days after the conclusion of the
hearing in 9,idated the order. The court cited Superior Oil Co.
v. Foote, - to the effect that the statute requiring action within
thirty days of hearing does not effect an invalidation of an order
that is rendered after this; the purpose of the statute was to place
on the Board a responsibility to act expeditiously.
63/ State Oil and Gas Board of Alabama v. Seaman Paper Company, 235
So.2d 860, 36 O.&G.R. 1 (Ala. 1970).
64/ Code of Ala., 26:Section 179(33) (F), as quoted 235 So.2d at
875.
65/ 235 So.2d at 875.
66/ State Oil and Gas Board v. Brinkley, 329 So.2d 512,, 54 O.&G.R.
59 (Miss. 1976).
67/ Superior Oil Co. v. Foote, 214 Miss. 857, 59 So.2d 85, 1
.O.&G.R. 1239 (Miss. 1952).
6 8Order not issued within 30 days upheld - In Ohmart v.
Dennis, the court ruled that where more than 30 days elapsed
between submission of the controversy to the commission and the entry
of the commission order, the order was not invalid. The court said:
"The 30-day requirement is directory, a rule of practice, and6Mt
mandatory. The delay did not constitute prejudicial error."
9. Form of Order - Findings
A problem increasingly raised as more state courts become
concerned about procedural due process in administrative law is
whether the form of the order or decision meets statutory criteria
and judicial standards. The statute may be the conservation statute
or the state administrative procedures act. The source of the
judicial standards may be constitutional concern for due process or
it may be a view that detailed findings are required of the agency to
facilitate judicial review and are implicit in the fact that judicial
review is provided for by statute.
The form of the order, particularly in the specificity of
its findings and conclusions, is significant as it relates to the
ability of a reviewing court to determine if the agency has acted
within the statutory authority it has been granted and if the agency
has fulfilled its statutory duties. A distinction may be made
between findings of fact and conclusions of law. A distinction may
also be made between basic facts and ultimate facts (sometimes spoken
of as a mixed question of law and fact). These distinctions and
their consequences will be brought out in the discussions of the
individual cases. While these distinctions are a common feature of
administrative law, it is best to look at them in the context of a
court's specific application of the principles to conservation
matters.
Some courts demand a greater degree of specificity than
others, perhaps unreasonably so. Geology is an inexact science, and
agencies must make decisions with limited data. Where expert wit-
nesses disagree, as for example over the placement of a fault or the
location of a water level, the fairest solution may well be to take a
compromise approach that does not exactly correspond to the data of
either expert witness. But a candid statement of finding that the
68/ Ohmart v. Dennis, 188 Neb. 260, 196 N.W.2d 181, 42 O.&G.R. 621
(1972).
69/ 196 N.W.2d at 184.
agency is splitting a difference between experts down the middle
might well prove unacceptable as a rationale to a court. Perhaps
like statutes and sausages it is better not to examine too closely
the manner in which the result is reached, so long as the result is
acceptable. Perhaps, too, this is why other courts will not demand a
high degree of specificity and will instead emphasize that the agency
must work with limited data and exercise discretion.
The cases on the form of order do not lend themselves to
doctrinal analysis or grouping by topic. Hence, I will simply
organize the decisions by state for the guidance they may give as to
the standards under which one will practice.
A. Kansas
The Kansas court found the commission's findings adequate
in the case 6,Southwest Kansas Royalty Owners v. State Corporation
Commission, - where it reviewed an order of the Kansas Corporation
Commission amending the basic proration order for the Hugoton Gas
Field to allow infill drilling. Appellants contended that the
commission did not give a concise and specific statement of the
relevant law and basic facts which persuaded it that an adequate
market existed for infill gas as required by its own rules. While
failure by the commission to follow its own rules is error, and while
the commission is required to give clear and complete findings of
essential facts on which its orders rest, the court said the Commission
is not, however, required to explain why it did not accept every
piece of evidence presented. The commission adequately explained its
findings that a market existed for infill gas.
The Kansas Supreme Court has relied on the agency's own
rules to impose a requirement of more detailed findings. But the
court went on to indicate that the requirement was also part of a
broader principle of administrative law. Th case of Cities Service
Gas Company v. State Corporation Commission - / involved an order of
the Commission to assert jurisdiction over all interstate natural gas
pipelines operating within Kansas that made direct mainline sales to
Kansas industrial customers. The Commission made findings and
70/ Southwest Kansas Royalty Owners v. State Corporation Commission,
769 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1989).
71/ Cities Service Gas Company v. State Corporation Commission, 440
P.2d 660, 31 O.&G.R. 491 (Kan. 1968).
entered an order on which it based jurisdiction, requiring a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity for direct sales by such
pipelines within Kansas. The trial court set the order aside. Under
the Commission's own Rule No. 82-1-232, the order of the Commission
had to, inter alia, summarize the evidence, list all findings of fact
and list all conclusions of law. The Commission, said the Kansas
Supreme Court, violated its own rule. The order failed to contain a
summary of the evidence introduced by the companies and did not
contain basic findings of fact on which the Commission relied. "An
undigested transcript," d 9,ared the court, "is not a substitute for
basic findings of fact." - At best the order only contained
findings of ultimate fact, most of which were expressed in the
language of the statute. That was not enough, in the absence of
basic findings, to support it. The court said that it "must be
possible for the reviewing court to measure the findings against the
evidence from which they were educed. Findings not based on evidence,
but on suspicion and conjecture, are arbitrary and baseless . . .
Moreover, it is equally well settled that the lack of express findings
of fact AY an administrative agency may not be supplied by implication
The court indicated it would not search the record to
ascertain whether there was evidence from which ultimate findings
could be made. Detailed findings were required to facilitate judicial
review, avoid judicial usurpation of administrative functions, assure
more careful administrative consideration to protect against careless
and arbitrary actions, assist the parties in planning their cases for
rehearing the judicial review, and keep such agencies within their
jurisdiction as prescribed by the Legislature.
To the Commission's assertion that the order merely set
forth policy, the court replied that the Commission could not issue a
valid order without following the agency's rule and the basic princi-
ples of administrative law. The Public Utility Act, it was said,
imposed the specific requirement of making specific findings: "Where
legislative power is delegated subject to a condition, it is a
requirement of constitutional government that the conditions be
fulfilled. . . . In default of such fulfillment, there is no official
72/ 440 P.2d 668.
73/ "An ultimate finding is a conclusion of law or at least a
determination of a mixed question of law and fact. It is to be
distinguished from the basic findings of primary, evidentiary or
circumstantial facts." 440 P.2d 668.
74/ 440 P.2d 668.
action - only the vain show of it." 5/ So it set aside the order.
The trial court had made its own findings, but this was a usurpation
of the Commission's function.
The Kansas court has also had occasion to concern itself
with the form of a Commission order in determining when the order was
made for purposes of a party's right to seek rehearing. Thi 6yas in
Cities Service Gas Company v. State Corporation Commission. The
Corporation Commission approved a water-flood project on April 25,
1962. The order was mailed on April 30. Cities Service received
notice by mail on May 2, 1962 and filed a petition for rehearing on
May 9, 1962. The petition was overruled by the Commission and Cities
Service sued to overturn the order. But the district court said the
rehearing petition, a filing required in order to preserve a right to
seek judicial review was not timely filed; it was not filed within
10 days of the "making" of the order. The Kansas Supreme Court
reversed. An orde cannot be deemed made while it is in the bosom of
the Commission. - The opinion syllabus stated: "Where no express
provision for notice is made in a statute, if there be nothing in the
statute which prevents notice from b 7 g given, the requirement of
reasonable notice will be implied." -
B. Louisiana
The Louisiana courts have expected the Commissioner of
Conservation to make findings which are necessary to support an order
on judicial review. But they have been more realistic than the
courts of several of the other producing states about the degree of
specificity that can or must be achieved in an order. The courts
have been willing to let the record support the findings rather than
imposing a rigid duty on the agency to demonstrate the decisional
process in the order itself.
75/ 440 P.2d 669.
76/ Cities Service Gas Company v. State Corporation Commission, 192
Kan. 707, 391 P.2d 74, 21 O.&G.R. 282 (Kan. 1964).
77/ The court relied on the agency's regulations which looked to
the date of service as constituting the effective date. The court
took note of statistics showing that 738 out of 1600 orders of the
Commission became final before they were even mailed out under the
district court's construction of the statute.
78/ 391 P.2d 74, 75.
In Brown v. Sutton, 9/ the plaintiff claimed that the four
requirements for creation of a field-wide unit were not set forth as
explicit findings in the order and the order was thus void. These
were, he asserted, mandatory findings of jurisdictional facts upon
which the order's issuance was conditioned. The Court of Appeals had
agreed with this position, but the Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed
after examining the record:
Although some of the evidence which supports all four of the
mandatory conditions which must be satisfied for issuance of a
valid order are not contained in the order itself, the conditions
are in fact supported by the record. Due to the fact that none
of these mandatory conditions were contested at the hearing,
except notice, failure to include some of the findings in the
order itself involves no prejudice to Brown, the only party
complaining of the order's invalidity. . . . P cipally the
findings are articulated in the order itself.
The court went on to observe that a contrary decision might
follow in respect to a mandatory condition which had been contested
and where the Commissioner's expertise should have been employed in a
finding. The court also made it clear that the state's power should
be exercis ,only "where the statutory authority affirmatively
appears." The purposes of such concern are that the Commissioner
give proper regard for valuable property rights and to give the
reviewing courts the assistance of an expert judgment on a knotty
phase of a technical subject.
The case of Summers v. Sutton 2/ involved a revision of a
unit based on new data from a second well drilled within the confines
of the existing unit. The size of the unit was reduced from 231
acres to 161 acres, relying on geological data showing that the sand
had shaled out in the area of the second well. The plaintiffs
founded many of their claims of the invalidity of the revision of the
unit on violations of the state administrative procedure act. The
plaintiffs urged, for example, that the order did not contain a
concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the
79/ Brown v. Sutton, 356, So.2d 965, 60 O.&G.R. 29 (La. 1978).
80/ 356 So. 2d at 973, 60 O.&G.R. at 43.
81/ 356 So.2d at 973, 60 O.&G.R. at 44.
82/ Summers v. Sutton, 428 So.2d 1121, 78 O.&G.R. 41 (La. App.
1983).
findings or the reasg_ therefor; instead, it contained only conclu-
sionary statements. The court held that the act was satisfied:
While the administrative agency must articulate the basis for
its decision, where the findings and reasons therefor are
necessarily implicit in the record and the record readily yields
substantial evidence to support the administrative determination,
the administrative order is not invalid merely because of the
agency's failu ,to make explicit its finding which was already
self evident. -
C. Mississippi
Effect of use of non-statutor5 erminology in a finding -
In Stacy v. Tomlinson Interests, Inc., the Mississippi Oil and
Gas Board had entered an order with a finding that the "rights of all
parties owning an interest in said proposed unit will be protected."
(Emphasis added.) Reversing a trial court judgment that the order
was void because it referred to unit rather than the statutory word
"pool," the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the substance of the
Board's finding was that the co-equal and correlative rights of the
owners in the common pool of oil would be protected in accordance
with the statutory policy, and that it "would be promoting form ove6 /
substance to find that the magic word 'pool' had to be used .
D. New Mexico
The New Mexico Supreme Court has gone about as far as any
producing state has gone in demanding findings of a conservation
agency. It has found the findings inadequate in several cases. The
first of themwas Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation
Commission, - the first case to reach the New Mexico Supreme Court
83/ La. R.S. 49:958.
84/ 428 So.2d at 1128, 78 O.&G.R. 54.
85/ Stacy v. Tomlinson Interests, Inc., 405 So.2d 93, 71 O.&G.R.
519 (Miss. 1981).
86/ 405 So.2d at 95, 71 O.&G.R. at 519.
87/ Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M.
310, 373 P.2d 809, 18 O.&G.R. 69 (1962).
concerjg the merits of any controversy determined by the Commis-
sion.
Continental involved the Jalmat Pool which the Commissionin 1954 prorated on a "pure acreage" formula. In 1958 the Commission
changed the formula to 25% acreage/75% deliverability. In a challenge
to the order, the court found the findings of the agency inadequate.
The court set forth its standard as follows:
In order to protect correlative rights, it is incumbent upon the
commission to determine, 'so far as it is practical to do so,'
certain foundationary matters, without which the correlative
rights of the various owners cannot be ascertained. Therefore,
the commission, by 'basic conclusions of fact' (or what might be
termed 'findings'), must determine, insofar as practicable,(1) the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract;(2) the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool; (3) the
proportion that (1) bears to (2); and (4) what portion of the
arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste. That the
extent of the correlative rights must first be deterw;9 ed before
the commission can act to protect them is manifest. -
The findings and conclusions of the Commission contained in
the order lacked any mention of the above factors. The commission,
said the court, made no finding as to the amounts of recoverable gasin the pool, or under the various tracts; it made no finding as to
the amount of gas that could be practicably obtained without waste;
it made no finding concerning drainage; it made no finding that
correlative rights were not being protected under the old formula, or
at least that they would be better protected under the new formula.
There was no indication that the commission attempted to do any of
these things, even to the extent of 'insofar as is practicable.'
The former pure acreage formula was valid until successfully
attacked, but the attack had failed. The Commission's finding that
the order would result in a more equitable allocation of the gas
production than under the present formula was not a substitute for or
equivalent of a finding that the present formula did not protect
correlative rights. The order was thus void for lacking the basic
findings necessary to and upon which jurisdiction depended. The
88/ In Oil Conservation Commission v. Brand, 65 N.M. 384, 338 P.2d113 (1959) the court had ruled on procedural matter in this same
case.
89/ 373 P.2d at 814-15.
matter was not remanded since the order would be void based on the
record of the Commission. This leads one to suspect that the concern
over the specificity of the findings was really a concern over the
substance of the decision.
The New Mexico court found the agency's findings adequate
to satisfy the standards of Continental in El Xo Natural Gas Company
v. Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico. 7-/ The applicant
sought change in proration formula in the Basin-Dakota gas pool from
the existing 25-75 (25% acreage plus 75% acreage, times deliverability)
to a 60-40 formula. The Commission granted the application. Under
Continental, the Commission had to find four things: 1) the amount
of recoverable gas under each producer's tract; 2) the amount of
recoverable gas in the pool; 3) the proportion that 1 bears to 2; and
4) what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without
waste. The complaining party claimed that all four were jurisdic-
tional, and, absent any one of them, the Commission lacked authority
to consider or change any production formula. Only number 4 was said
to be missing. The court said its "review of the Commission's
findings reveals that it did make the requested findings in language
equivalent to that required by Continentajland did adopt a formula in
compliance with statutory requirements." 9
The New Mexico court returned its strict requirements in a
1975 case in which the agency did not specify why it was not persuaded,
by one party's evidence. In Fasken v. Oil Conservation 
Commission,
the Commission had rejected an application for a determination that
the applicant's leased property was in a separate and distinct pool
from that with which it had been pooled. The Commission made no
specific finding as to why it disregarded the evidence presented by
the applicant. Because the Commission had failed to make specific
findings as to the reasns for its ultimate fact determination that
the lands involved constituted a single source of supply, the court
remanded to the Commission for such findings. Stated the court,
"The theories [as to what the subsurface geologic conditions werej of
each party sound equally logical and reasonable and each is diametri-
cally opposed to those of the other party. The difficulty with them
is that they emanate from the lips and pens of counsel and are not
90/ El Paso Natural Gas Company v. Oil Conservation Commission of
New Mexico, 76 N.M. 268, 414 P.2d 496, 25 O.&G.R. 676 (1966).
91/ 414 P.2d at 499.
92/ Fasken v. Oil Conservation Commission, 87 N.M. 292, 532 P.2d
588, 50 O.&G.R. 483 (1975).
bolstered by the expertise of the Commission to which we gw special
weight and credence . . ., nor included in its findings." - The
thrust of the opinion was that without the requisite findings, the
court could not determine if they were supported by substantia14 /
evidence. The court spelled out the requirements as follows: -
In cases where the sufficiency of the Commission's findings is
in issue or their substantial support is questioned, after the
dust of the Commission hearing has settled, the following must
appear:
A. Findings of ultimate facts which are material to the issues.
Such findings were characterized as 'foundationary matters,'
'basic conclusions of fact' and 'basic findings' in Continental
Oil v. Oil Conservation Com'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
These findings have to do with such ultimate factors as whether
a common source of supply exists, the prevention of waste, the
protection of correlative rights and matters relative to net
drainage. ...
B. Sufficient findings to disclose the reasoning of the Commis-
sion in reaching its ultimate findings. In Continental, it was
said that although elaborate findings are not necessary, never-
theless: ". . . Administrative findings by an expert administra-
tive commission should be sufficiently extensive to show .
the basis of the commission's order."
The findings must have substantial support in the record.
While the court's standard certainly reflects an ideal for
a decisional process, it simply fails to give appropriate recognition
to the difficulties of issuance of an order. Not only will the
experts before the agency disagree, so too will the members of a
staff of an agency, and so too will the different members of the
agency. The determination of an ultimate question, such as whether a
particular sharing formula is just and reasonable, will not depend on
a particular fact capable of being found, but on the lack of proof of
a fact or lack of agreement on proof of a fact. Where the agency
members (or staff) agree upon a conclusion but do not necessarily
agree upon a particular underlying fact, the court should not over-
turn the decision.
93/ 532 P.2d at 589.
94/ 532 P.2d at 590.
E. North Dakota
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the findings of
the Industrial Commission were inadequate to sustain the order in
Hystad v. Industrial Commission. 1 The statute at issue required
units of uniform size and shape for the entire pool, though exceptions
could be granted. A deviation from the standard of uniform size and
shape to protect correlative rights had to be explained, the court
held, and remanded the case for further findings from the Commission.
While recognizing findings on such factual questions may not be
practicable in the early stages of development for a pool, the
Commission had to elaborate on how correlative rights were being
protected. The Commission, said the court, "must explain why the
deviation is necessary within the context of the right of each owner
to a just and equitable share of the common source of supply and the
duty to other owners not to damage or take n,,undue proportion of oil
or gas from that common source of supply." - The findings did not
elaborate on whose correlative rights were being protected or how
they were being protected. The reasons given did not enable the
court to understand the basis of the Commission's decision. A
concurring justice thought that the basis of the Commission's deci-
sion was clear, but he simply did not agree that correlative rights
were being protected by the order.
F. Oklahoma
Despite the extensive litigation over orders entered by the
Corporation Commission in Oklahoma, one does not find that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has imposed strict requirements on the Commis-
sion as to the specificity of its findings. There are probably
several reasons for this. One is that the Commission is subject only
to the rulemaking provisions of the st07 administrative procedures
act, not the adjudicatory provisions. - The second reason is
95/ Hystad v. Industrial Commission, 389 N.W.2d 590, 90 O.&G.R. 260
(N.D. 1986).
96/ 389 N.W.2d at 597, 90 O.&G.R. at 273.
97/ See Cameron v. Corporation Commission, 414 P.2d 266, 24 O.&G.R.
444 (Okla. 1966) where the court in response to a claim of
insufficiency of the Commission's statement of reasons for its
actions in a ruling stated: "We point out that the Corporation
Commission is not subject to the Administrative Procedures Act of
(Footnote Continued)
related to the first: the Comm ion is a court of record when it
acts in its judicial capacity. - Just as a reviewing court will
look to the record of a trial court proceeding without imposing
exacting requirements for detailed findings and an explanation of the
reasoning on a trial court judge rendering a decision, so too does
the Oklahoma court approach the decisions of the Corporation Commis-
sion. But there have been several cases which have taken up issues
relating to the form of an order or decision.
Order may permit, rather than requ45, drilling of unit
well - In Sellers v. Corporation Commission - the plaintiff owner
of 2.5 acres of minerals in a 40-acre spacing unit sought to vacate a
pooling order of the Commission on the ground that the applicant for
the order did not unconditionally propose to drill a well and the
Commission did not enter an order requiring the drilling of a well.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional or
statutory requirement for the applicant to commit to drilling a well
or that the order require this.
(Footnote Continued)
1963, 75 O.S. Supp. 1963, Sec. 301, et seq., except Sec. 304(a)
thereof, relative to the filing of rules." 414 P.2d at 271. The
Oklahoma legislature amended the Administrative Procedures Act in
1987 to provide that, effective July 1, 1988, the Corporation Commis-
sion would be required to comply with most provisions of Article I of
the Act, which primarily concern rulemaking. Okla. Stat. Ann.,
tit. 75, Section 250.4(A) (2). The Corporation Commission is still
exempt from Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act, which
pertains to adjudications and judicial review.
98/ Art. 7, Section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides: "Thejudicial power of this State shall be vested in . . . a Supreme Court
• . . and such Boards, Agencies and Commissions created by Constitu-
tion or established by statute as exercise adjudicative authority or
render decisions in individual proceedings." Art. 9, Section 19 of
the Oklahoma Constitution provides: "In all matters pertaining to
public visitation, regulation or control of corporations, and within
the jurisdiction of the Commission, it shall have powers and authority
of a court of record." See Monson v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Corpora-
tion Commission, 673 P.2d 839, 78 O.&G.R. 353 (Okla. 1983).
99/ Sellers v. Corporation Commission, 624 P.2d 1061, 69 O.&G.R.
292 (Okla. 1981).
Necessity of transcript - In Bray v. Cap Corp., 100/ the
owner of minerals who was force pooled sought review of the Corpora-
tion Commission's treatment of a hearing examiner's recommendations
where there was no transcript made of the examiner's hearing. The
court noted that under the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's Rules of
Practice the party taking exceptions to the examiner's summary of
evidence is the one to furnish the Commission with a transcript. The
court ruled also that the Commission is not required to rule sepa-
rately on each exception taken by a party.
101/A similar issue had arisen in Halpin v. Corporation Commis-
sion. The court said that the Commission had chosen not to look
behind a trial examiner's summation of the evidence unless an adversely
affected litigant demonstrated a need for such inquiry. The court
believed that there were sound reasons for such a policy. Here the
complainants failed to specify in what respect the trial examiner's
summary was deficient. In the absence of a showing why a transcript
was necessary, denial of a continuance pending completion of a
transcript was not a denial of due process under the circumstances
where the parties had available a full sound transcription of the
proceedings before the trial examiner.
G. South Dakota
The South Dakota court found the fi Jgs of fact were
adequate in Application of Koch Exploration. - Koch sought to
unitize part of an oil field for secondary and tertiary recovery.
The order of the agency had incorporated the Unit Agreement by
reference and coupled it with a concise statement of the underlying
facts. Stated the court: "The Board weighed the expert opinion
evidence vented to it; its decision finds ample support in the
record." -
100/ Bray v. Cap Corp., 571 P.2d 1224, 60 O.&G.R. 198 (Okla. 1977).
101/ Halpin v. Corporation Commission, 575 P.2d 109, 59 O.&G.R. 314
(Okla. 1977).
102/ Application of Koch Exploration, 387 N.W.2d 530, 89 O.&G.R.
549 (S.D. 1986). In addition, the parties had not preserved the
issue on appeal by timely raising their objection.
103/ 387 N.W.2d at 538, 89 O.&G.R. at 563.
H. Texas
In Musick v. Railroad Commission, 104/ the Texas court
found the final order denying an exception well permit did set forth
sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, demonstrating the
basis of the agency's decision, for the various purposes that
underlie the requirements of the Texas Administrative Procedure and
Texas Register Act. In addition, the parties agreed that the facts
were undisputed and the court could not, in consequence, conceive
that Musick had been prejudiced by the omission of which she
complained.
Conclusion of law did not have to be accompanied by find-
ings of fact - The appliggt for pooling in Buttes Resources Company
v. Railroad Commission - was the lessee of 55 acres adjacent to a
voluntary unit of 179 acres. The operator of the unit was Buttes,
which had formerly held leases on the 55 acres. The applicant made
an offer to Buttes to pool all 55 acres. Buttes contended the offer
was not fair, but the Railroad Commission found it was fair and
entered a pooling order. The court took up an issue of the findings
made by the Commission. The Commission's conclusion that the pooling
applicant's offer was fair and reasonable was couched in statutory
language. The court observed that there was a distinction between
findings of fact and findings of law under the Texas administrative
procedure act. The court concluded that the statement that the offer
was fair and reasonable was a conclusion of law and did not have to
be accompanied by underlying findings of fact.
Necessity of specific findings 6 act by Railroad Commis-
sion - In Railroad Commission v. Palmer, 
- the Texas Railroad
Commission had ordered Palmer in 1977 to plug an abandoned well which
had originally been abandoned and plugged in August 1963. The
Railroad Commission contended that Palmer had reentered the well in
September 1963. The Commission order was based on an adoption of the
findings of report of a hearing examiner, but the Commission order
itself did not state findings or conclusions. Palmer appealed, and
the trial court ruled that the Railroad Commission had to make
104/ Musick v. Railroad Commission, 747 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.
1988), error denied.
105/ Buttes Resources Company v. Railroad Commission, 732 S.W.2d
675 (Tex. App., 1987), writ ref'd n.r.e.
106/ Railroad Commission v. Palmer, 586 S.W.2d 934, 64 O.&G.R. 348
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
findings on specified facts in order to justify its order. The
Railroad Commission appealed this, contending that the findings of
the Commission were sufficient to inform Palmer of the reasons for
the Commission's decision ordering him to plug the well. The court
of appeals held for Palmer, restating the principles s 7 orth by the
Texas Supreme Court in Miller v. Railroad Commission. - These
were first, to restrain any disposition on the part of the Commission
to enter its order without full consideration of the evidence and a
serious appraisal of the facts; secondly, to inform persons opposing
the order of the facts found so that they may intelligibly prepare
and present an appeal to the courts; and thirdly, to assist the
courts in properly exercising their functions of reviewing the order.
In another case, the Texas Supreme Court has stated: "The findings
should be such that a court, on reading them, could fairly and
reasonably say that they sup?8 0 the ultimate findings of fact
required for its decision." - It was not clear to the court in
Palmer what the findings of the Railroad Commission actually were, so
the court remanded for further findings.
Findings found to be adequate - It wa%0 ged in Imperial
American Resources Fund v. Railroad Commission - that the findings
of fact in an order granting an application for a Rule 37 exception
location well were not sufficient under the Texas Administrative
Procedure And Texas Register Act. But the court found the "findings
are clear and explicit. They were not couched in terms other than as
findings; neither are they mere conclusions, references to, recitals
or summations of the evidence, or otherwise insufficient. . . . On
the contrary, they are findings upon the material issues tolb
reviewed and tested under the substantial evidence 
rule." 0
Because the findings were not set forth in statutory language, it was
not required that they be accompanied by a concise and explicit
statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.
No judicial review of individual findings without review of
order - One should note also the case Champlin Exploration, Inc. v.
107/ Miller v. Railroad Commission, 363 S.W.2d 244, 245-6 (Tex.
1962).
108/ Railroad Commission v. Graford Oil Corporation, 557 S.W.2d
946, 950, 59 O.&G.R. 338, 342-43 (Tex. 1977).
109/ Imperial American Resources Fund v. Railroad Commission, 557
S.W.2d 280, 59 O.&G.R. 553 (Tex. 1977).
110/ 557 S.W.2d at 286, 59 O.&G.R. at 562.
Railroad Commission of Texas, L where the court held that the
administrative procedures act's provision for judicial revi y2 or one
"who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case" 
-Y2 did
not furnish a basis for review to a party who agreed with the order,
but not one of the findings on which the order was based. The party
was afraid the finding would be detrimental to it in another judicial
proceeding. The statutory provision was held to refer to the final
order of the agency, not to individual findings and conclusions with
which a claimant disagrees.
I. Wyoming
Necessity of specific findings of fact - The Wyoming
Supreme Court has required very detailed findings of the state's
conservation commission, albeit recognizing that there are practical
limits to what the agency can determine as to geological and engi-
neering facts. The case in which the court set forth its standards
and the rationale of such requirements, Pan American PetroleVV 3 ,
Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, - grew
out of an application for a permit for a well at an exception
location by Pan American. The reservoir involved had first been
discovered in 1914, and drilling took place over the years without
spacing rules. The passage of the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation
Act was in 1951. In 1965 the Commission adopted Rule 302, which was
a statewide 40-acre spacing rule. The well was to be in the center
of the 40 acres with a 200-foot tolerance and a requirement that the
well be 920 feet or more from any other well location in that pool.
Rule 303 provided a method to obtain exceptions to 302. Marathon
opposed Pan American's application. The Commission denied the
application on the basis that Pan American's existing wells would
adequately drain the tracts. In 1967 the Wyoming legislature amended
the Act to include a provision for protection of correlative rights
in the exercise of the power to establish drilling units. Pan
American again sought an exception well permit. The Commission again
denied the application, entering certain findings, including one that
the evidence submitted "does not, without undue speculation,
111/ Champlin Exploration, Inc. v. Railroad Commission of Texas,
627 S.W.2d 250, 73 O.&G.R. 81 (Tex. App. 1982) writ ref. n.r.e.
112/ Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-13a Section 19(e)
(Supp. 1981).
113/ Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission, 446 P.2d 550, 32 O.&G.R. 501 (Wyo. 1968).
establish sufficient cause for the granting of an exception to
Rule 302 Il/ for the protection of applicant's correlative
rights." - The court observed that agencies must resort to the
testimony of experts, and it is for the commission as trier of fact
to determine the weight of the evidence. It is for the courts "to
see to it that the acceptance or rejection of suchly dence, in whole
or in part, is on a reasonable and proper basis." -
To aid the court, the state administrative procedure act
requires the agency in a contested case to include "findings of fact
and conclusions of law separately stated." The court said that such
requirement imposes upon an agency the duty to make findings of basic
facts upon all of the material issues in the proceeding and upon
which its ultimate findings of fact or conclusions of law are based.
Unless that were done there could be no rational basis for judicial
review. The court had to be shown what underlying evidentiary facts
the agency relied upon. Findings of those basic facts would not be
implied from ultimate findings. Without this, "there could be no
assurance that an ag has made a 'reasoned analysis' of all the
material evidence." - Furthermore, "orderly review requires that
the primary basic facts must be settled before it can be determined
that ultimate facts found by an agency conform to law. Failure of an
agency to meet its responsibilities in the premises makes its deter-
mination yjeptible to the charge that the order entered is contrary
to law." - Here the Commission gave only ultimate facts or
conclusions of law and not basic facts. The court set forth the
following standard:
All of the material evidence offered by the parties must be
carefully weighed by the agency as the trier of the facts;
conflicts in the evidence must be resolved, and the underlying
or basic facts which prompt the ultimate conclusion on issues of
fact drawn by the agency in sustaining the prima facie case
made, or in rejecting it for the reason it has been satisfacto-
rily met or rebutted by countervailing evidence, must be suffi-
114/ 446 P.2d at 553.
115/ 446 P.2d at 555.
116/ 446 P.2d at 555.
117/ 446 P.2d at 555.
ciently set forth in the decision r red. Otherwise the
proceeding is not ripe for review.
The ma U was remanded to the Commission for further considera-
tion.
In Larsen v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 120/ the
Wyoming Supreme Court vacated an order of the Commission for an
80-acre spacing because the Commission had apparently failed to make
administrative findings required of it by law and further that the
Commission had considered economic waste in establishing the unit,
something not permitted by the Wyoming statute. The court ruled that
before a drilling unit could be established the Commission must find
that such a unit was necessary to protect correlative rights or to
prevent waste. The Commission was required by the state administra-
tive procedures act to make findings of basic facts upon which its
ultimate findings of fact or conclusions were based, wf gut which
there could be no rational basis for judicial review. - The court
went on to state: "It is impossible for this court to discharge its
appellate obligation of determining whether or not findings of fact
are supported by the evidence, and lawful, logical and reasonable
conclusions have been drawn, unless a detailed finding of facton all
the material issues is made by the administrative agency." - The
Commission's findings of fact here made no mention of the correlative
rights of the appellant royalty and overriding royalty owners. Also,
the findings did not indicate the amount of oil that could be
recovered "without waste" as that phrase was defined by the statutes.
118/ 446 P.2d at 557.
119/ On remand, the Commission entered additional findings. But
the court still did not consider these sufficient to support the
Commission's denial of the permit application. Accordingly, the
decision was arbitrary, and the district court's direction to the
Commission for the issuance of the permit was affirmed. Marathon Oil
Company v. Pan American Petroleum Corporation, 473 P.2d 575, 38
O.&G.R. 77 (Wyo. 1970).
120' Larsen v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 569 P.2d 87, 61
O.&G.R. 246 (Wyo. 1977).
121/ The court looked to Pan American Petroleum Corporation v.
Wyomina Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 446 P.2d 550, 32 O.&G.R.
501 (Wy. 1968).
122/ 569 P.2d at 91, 61 O.&G.R. at 252.
The court remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. It
stated: "At a minimum, in order to determine the extent of the
correlative rights in question, the Commission must establish:
(1) the amount of recoverable oil in the pool; (2) the amount of
recoverable oil under the various tracts; (3) the proportion that 1
bears tol1 / and (4) the amount of oil that can be recovered without
waste." - It added that the Commission had to ma 4 his finding
"insofar as it is reasonably practicable to do so." -
123/ 569 P.2d 92, 61 O.&G.R. 255. The court was adopting the
standard of the case of Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation
Commission, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809, 18 O.&G.R. 69 (N. Mex. 1962).
124/ 569 P.2d at 92, 61 O.&G.R. at 255. See Big Piney Oil and Gas
Company v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 715 P.2d 557,
91 O.&G.R. 620 (Wyo. 1986) for a case in which the test of Larsen was
met.
